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Abstract This paper explores the phenomenological concept ‘we’ based 
on a pre-existing understanding of traditional phenomenology alongside 
a new aspect of the concept by introducing an analysis of ‘we’ in Korean. 
The central questions of this paper are whether the ‘we’ can be 
understood as more than a collection of individuals, whether the ‘we’ 
can precede both ‘I’ and ‘thou,’ and whether the ‘we’ as an extension of 
the ‘I’ or an extended self should necessarily mean the plural of the ‘I.’ 
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 The Problem of the ‘We’ 
As one of the most crucial concepts for the study of social intentionality 
as well as time-consciousness, ‘we’ is a much-discussed theme in 
phenomenology nowadays, yet the concept remains less than fully 
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explored. From Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, to Fichte’s Ich=Ich, 
Husserl’s Selbstbewußtsein, and Heidegger’s Dasein, the focus of 
Western philosophy has traditionally been focused on the ‘I’ as subject, 
considered to be the basis of our understanding of self and the world. To 
a large extent, discourses on the ‘we’ have stayed caught in the system 
where this ‘I’ is taken as the core of an autonomous individual.  
In this framework, the ‘we’ is taken as the plural form of the ‘I.’ In 
other words, this ‘we’ is ‘I’ with (or for) other ‘I’s, in which all ‘I’s 
constitute the basis and starting point of a collective subjectivity. 
Typically, when the ‘we’ has been an object of study, it was analyzed 
from within a perspective of an I-Thou relation in which the ‘you’ and 
the ‘I’ were the necessary conditions for each other’s ontological status 
as different subjects, and together they formed an intersubjective we-
ness. The ‘we’ is therefore the plural of individual and subjective ‘I’s: ‘I’ 
+ ‘I’ (you). 
However, this definition is not sufficient for a full understanding of 
the ‘we’ next to the ‘other,’ because this entails another core problem in 
the philosophical work based on the system of ‘I’-subjectivity: how can 
the ‘other’ exist as other subjects, what is the relation between my 
perception of the ‘other’ and their existence, and how can this self-
dependent ‘I’ reach out to the other? These issues have ceaselessly raged 
around the relation of the individual subject and intersubjectivity, and 
because of this, many philosophers in the Western tradition, not just 
those mentioned above, have been accused of solipsism.  
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Any discussion of the ‘we’ cannot escape this problem as long as it is 
conceived of as an intersubjective concept made up of the combination 
of the ‘I’s of the self and the other (‘you’). When either ‘you’ stands as 
the precondition of the ‘I’ or the ‘I’ as the precondition of the ‘you,’ ‘I’ 
or ‘you’ have to come first for the ‘we’ to be there. In this system, the 
‘you’ is the other ‘I’s but not the third other: ‘we’ (I+you) ↔ the other. 
The central questions raised in the analysis of the ‘we’ concern (1) 
whether there is another possibility for understanding the ‘we’ in a 
manner other than as a collection of individual ‘I’s, (2) whether the ‘we’ 
can precede ‘I’ and ‘you,’ and whether the ‘I’ and ‘you’ can be extracted 
from the ‘we,’ (3) so that the third ‘other’ can have a place in the ‘we.’ 
When the ‘we’ can be proven to be more than ‘I’ + other ‘I’(s), there 
would also be another possibility for understanding the ‘other’ from a 
new perspective. Based on this different perspective on the self and the 
‘other’ uncloaked in the form of the ‘we,’ an empathetic understanding 
between the self and the ‘other’ could be re-examined with a new point 
of view. 
 ‘We’ in Traditional Western Theories 
1. ‘We’ as Plural of the ‘I’ 
In Western philosophy, the necessary condition for intersubjectivity is a 
plurality of subjectivities based upon the concept of the ‘we.’ The 
German concept Intersubjektivität seems to have first appeared in the 
works of Johaness Volkelt in 1885, and it was first used in English in 
1896 to describe a thing that has validity for all persons independently 
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of every subject (Zahavi 2014, 97). Husserl uses the term to designate a 
plurality of subjects and the relation that exists between them (Husserl 
1973a-c). In his phenomenology, intersubjectivity is the necessary 
condition for the constitution of subjectivity as an ego (Husserl 1954, 
175). He asserted that “the other is the first human being, not I” (Husserl 
1973b, 418) and that “self-consciousness and consciousness of others 
are inseparable” (Husserl 1954, 256). However, this self-consciousness 
is an ego, which, as an ‘I,’ necessarily has its ‘thou,’ its ‘we,’ and its 
‘you,’ where this ‘I’ has its place among the rest of all other personal 
pronouns (Husserl 1954, 270). In other words, if there were no ‘you,’ 
there would also be no ‘I’ in contrast to it; that is, the ‘I’ is only 
constituted as ‘I’ in contrast to the ‘you’ (Husserl 1973a, 6, 247). In this 
context, the ‘we’ is a fundamental part of the existence of ‘I.’ This 
formulation, though, confirms only that the ‘we’ is a part of ‘I.’ The ‘we’ 
itself is not a self, but is constituted through the ‘I,’ a pure ego with 
absolute individuation (Husserl 1952, 299-300).  
The pure ego is another name for the subject of experience (Husserl 
1952, 97), and lived experiences in the flux of consciousness have an 
essence that is absolutely their own; they bear their individuation in 
themselves (Husserl 1952, 299-300). In this system, Husserl came up 
with the concept of ‘pairing’ to include the other in this resolutely 
individual experience. ‘Pairing’ is an “associatively constitutive 
component of my experience of someone else” (Husserl 1969, 112). 
However, this concept cannot yet guarantee the being of the other, 
because “this other is a reflection of my self and yet not the original 
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reflection; an analogon of my self, yet not the analogon in the ordinary 
sense” (Husserl 1950, 125; see also Kojima 2000, 107). 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre defines the ‘we’ as subject, which is 
identical to the plural of the ‘I’ (Sartre 1992, 535): “In the we, nobody 
is the object. The we includes a plurality of subjectivities which 
recognize one another as subjectivities” (Sartre 1992, 535). Sartre 
clarifies that his understanding of the we relies on Heidegger’s 
understanding of Mitsein, which appears in Being and Time with the 
meaning of ‘To-be-with.’ He explains that “the very existence and use 
of this grammatical form [‘we’] necessarily refers us to a real experience 
of the Mitsein” (Sartre 1992, 535). This grammatical form of plural ‘I’ 
as subject uncloaks the “fundamental and transcending connection with 
the other” (Sartre 1992, 315). 
Sartre, however, argues that the ‘with’ in this Heideggerian 
construction of ‘To-be-with’ needs to be interpreted from a new 
perspective, which yields an altogether different meaning to this concept: 
“‘with’ does not infer the reciprocal relation of recognition and of 
conflict which would result from the appearance of a human-reality 
other than mine in the midst of the world” (Sartre 1992, 336). In this 
world, ‘I’ is not alone. The temporality of Dasein as ‘Being-in-the-world’ 
is not co-constructed with the other’s time. Dasein has been there 
already with history, but the construction of the ekstases of Dasein’s 
temporality does not include its experience with the other in the world.  
As Sartre points out, “Human-reality at the very heart of this ekstases 
remains alone” (Sartre 1992, 336). ‘I’ exists, though, related to other ‘I’s 
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in the world. This relationship to other ‘I’s is essential to my existence. 
In Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre insists: “The other is essential 
to my existence, as well as to the knowledge I have of myself. Under 
these conditions, my intimate discovery of myself is at the same time a 
revelation of the other as a freedom that confronts my own and that 
cannot think or will without doing so for or against me. We are thus 
immediately thrust into a world that we may call ‘intersubjectivity.’ It is 
in this world that man decides what he is and what others are” (Sartre 
2007, 41-42).  
According to Sartre’s explication, the concept of ‘we’ is not an 
expression of ‘my’ recognition of the other, nor simply a grammatical 
form of the sum of ‘I’s. However, the ‘I’ is still in the center of this 
Mitsein as the subject which connects to the other ‘I’s, and the preceding 
distinction between ‘I’ and the other is a necessary condition in this ‘we’ 
structure. This still conforms to, therefore, the form of “from ‘I’ to the 
‘we,’” and not the other way around. The discourse is firmly bound 
within the range of the reflection of ‘I,’ as David Carr articulates in 
“Cogitamus Ergo Sumus” with a doubt about ‘the idea of social subject’ 
in traditional philosophy: “Other individuals are analogues of myself; 
but the idea of a social subject seems at best a façon de parler, at worst 
pure myth or construction” (Carr 1986, 524). 
2. ‘We’ as Extended Self: Nosism 
Carr argued that the ‘we,’ as an expression of identification with and 
membership in a group (Carr 1986, 524f), is simply an exchange of the 
singular form of the first person to the plural form. However, the Korean 
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‘we’ as an extended self is not simply the plural of ‘I’s. It is rather closer 
to the concept of Gemeingefühl (Elberfeld 2015, 204f), which enables 
an individual to have his or her own self-consciousness as an extended 
self. Carr focuses more on the social aspect of the we-ness related to 
proactive social engagement and identification. He defines ‘we’ as a 
group of collective subjects, as distinguished from an objective group 
membership such as family, class, nation, ethnicity, etc., which are each 
formed without identification or participation in the group, while in 
Korean, ‘we’ is often used exactly within these groups such as ‘our 
country’ and ‘our family.’  
In this piece, however, discourse on ‘our country’ or ‘our people’ will 
be intentionally excluded to prevent the discussion from extending into 
the political-historical range, because the form of ‘our country’ or ‘our 
people’ is often associated with the history of the formation of the 
modern national identity of the Korean nation-state, which leads the 
discussion to an unavoidable connection with nationalism. This is 
remains outside of the scope of the present discussion. 
In Western languages, there are some similar phenomena where the 
‘we’ acts as an ‘extended self,’ such as pluralis excellentiae, which refers 
to plural words that take singular forms, and pluralis majestatis, which 
refers to the phenomenon in which a single person holding a high office, 
such as a sovereign or religious leader, refers to herself as ‘we,’ also 
known as the ‘royal we.’ 
Pluralis majestatis is a representative example of nosism, which 
refers to the phenomenon of using ‘we’ instead of the first person 
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singular to refer to oneself when expressing one’s personal opinions. 
Another example is the editorial ‘we,’ which is used by editorial 
columnists in newspapers or in other media when they, as an individual, 
refer to themselves as ‘we,’ thereby casting themselves in the role of a 
spokesperson. The author’s ‘we,’ or pluralis modestiae, is a similar case 
and is the practice common in mathematical or scientific literature of 
referring to a generic third person as ‘we.’1 
These forms of ‘we’ can all be substituted with the ‘you.’2 This you 
functions similarly to the ‘we’ not only in scientific literature, but also 
in spoken language, in such sentences as “you have to eat more 
vegetables,” where ‘you’ is used to refer not necessarily to the addressee 
as the specific ‘you,’ but rather ‘we’ in the general sense. The ‘you’ in 
the following quote, “When you sit with a nice girl for two hours you 
think it’s only a minute, but when you sit on a hot stove for a minute you 
think it’s two hours. That’s relativity,” can be replaced with ‘we’ without 
a change of meaning. This ‘you’ is rather ‘we,’ although it is expressed 
in the second person singular form. ‘We’ in this sense refers to ‘the 
reader and the author,’ as the author assumes that the reader agrees with 
the ideas that the author is presenting. This is actually also a common 
practice in philosophical works where ‘we’ may be familiar, and it is 
also something that occurs in comments in computer code. This ‘we,’ 
however, cannot be substituted with the ‘I,’ because this nosistic ‘we’ 
                                                             
1 An example of this occurs in the following quote: “we see that our extension of the principle 
of relativity implies the necessity of the law of the equality of inertial and gravitational mass.” 
(Albert Einstein. 1920. Relativity: The Special and General Theory, trans. Robert W. Lawson. 
London: Methuen & Co.) 
2 Or with ‘one’ or ‘das Man’ in German. 
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refers to a generic group of people rather than expressing the ‘I’-ness of 
the subject. When you say “Our family came from Seoul” in Korean, 
however, this ‘we’ in the form of ‘our family’ only includes those who 
actually belong to this family group, and not, for example, the global 
family or all extended family members. In other words, it simply means 
“my family.” 
At this point, let us go back to the basic question of the argument, 
whether the ‘we’ could be more than a collection of ‘I’s. Do the 
examples of nosism, pluralis majestatis and pluralis modestiae prove 
that the ‘we’ can be more than a collection of ‘I’s? The ‘we’ of pluralis 
majestatis and pluralis modestiae refer to one person who represents the 
‘other.’ I suspect that this ‘we’ still has to be considered as a collection 
of selves. In pluralis majestatis, the ‘we’ implies God and the king, in 
the sense that God is the king and the king is God. This extended self is 
approved after the coronation, which means the notion of the ‘we’ as 
‘the king = God’ is not pre-subjective. It is rather post-subjective. The 
self-identity of the King (A) as the ‘we’ is extended in the form of ‘the 
king (A) = God (B)’ or sometimes ‘the king (A) = the people (C),’ which 
means the collection of (A + B) or (A + C) is laid out in another 
subjective (A').  
The ‘we’ in pluralis modestiae also comes about in the process of 
transforming oneself into the ‘we,’ which assumes the agreement of the 
‘other,’ in this case the reader. Therefore, this ‘we’ is also formed 
through the act of collecting together multiple individuals, which in this 
case means the presumption of mutual agreement. 
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In the usage of the ‘we’ in Korean, on the other hand, when one says 
‘our home’ referring to one’s own home which is not shared with anyone 
else, this ‘we’ (A') is not a result of (A + B), but (A') itself is used to 
refer to an extended self, not to a self who is not recognized as a single 
person with the ‘other.’ This extension of ‘I’ is not derived from a 
collection of individuals, but it is there first, and then it creates room for 
the ‘other’ to come in. In other words, the ‘we’ in ‘our home’ can also 
be ‘myself’ and the ‘other’ if the ‘other’ joins the ‘we.’ However, as 
explained above, the collection of ‘I’ and the ‘other’ as other ‘I’s is not 
a condition nor a prerequisite in Korean of this ‘we’ of ‘our home.’ 
3. ‘I-Thou’ Relationship 
According to Husserl, self-consciousness and the consciousness of 
others are inseparable (Husserl 1954, 256). Husserl consequently holds 
that the personal ‘I’ has its origin in social life (Husserl 1973b, 175). 
“Personality is constituted only as the subject enters into social relations 
with others” (Husserl 1973b, 175). He understood ‘I’ in a relative 
relation to the other, namely, the ‘thou’ and the ‘we,’ in which the ego as 
a person “requires relation to a world which engages it. Therefore, ‘I,’ 
we and the world belong together” (Husserl 1952, 288). He ascribes a 
relative mode of being to the personal ‘I’ (Husserl 1952, 319).  
As mentioned above, the concepts ‘I’ and ‘we’ are relative in this 
context: ‘I’ requires ‘thou,’ ‘we,’ and the ‘other’ (Husserl 1952, 288). 
Martin Buber develops this idea of ‘we’ and subjectivity in his ‘I-Thou’ 
model (Buber 1995), which agrees with Hiroshi Kojima’s criticism that 
not only the ‘other’ of the ‘I-She/He/It’ structure, which Buber 
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differentiates from ‘I-Thou,’ but also the ‘thou’ in ‘I-Thou’ is taken as a 
passive object (Kojima 2000, 107). Of course, the other person(s) can 
proactively affect one and interact with one, while mere things are only 
there to be received as an object of one’s perception. However, what 
does this ‘proactively affecting’ mean between two different individuals? 
Can one understand and be affected by the ‘other’ without perceiving 
the ‘other’ through the projection of herself?  
This question leads us to another massive point of debate related to 
the authoritarian perspective of empathy elucidated by Lévinas. “Putting 
yourself in another’s shoes” can be interpreted with the implication that 
all empathetic activity is possible only from ‘my’ side. It can also be 
argued that things can also affect one through projection. For example, 
seeing a photo of one’s grandfather who has passed away can make one 
feel sad. How exactly does this work differently from seeing a person 
who cries, which causes one to feel sad as well? How about seeing a 
character in a film who affects one’s feelings? Is that person in the film 
an object or not?  
This is still a highly controversial debate that comes with a long 
history as to whether the ‘other’ can be perceived as another subject or 
ego at all. Kojima’s criticism that the ‘thou’ in the ‘I-Thou’ is not 
distinguished from an object from the perspective of ‘I’ could be 
understood in this framework, but I personally would not yet go so far 
as to expound upon this subject-object debate in this paper. 
The phenomenon of pluralis majestatis provides a clue to understand 
the ‘I-Thou’ model of the ‘we.’ The ‘royal we’ refers to the king who 
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acts conjointly with the authority of the deity, as in the form of ‘God and 
I,’ which is the fundamental base of the ‘I-Thou’ model for Buber. His 
Ich und Du begins with the theoretical foundation of his ‘I-Thou’ model: 
“Wer Du sprichst, hat kein Etwas, hat nichts. Aber er steht in der 
Beziehung” (Buber 1995, 5). All of my experiences start and are based 
on this relationship [Beziehung], which is possible only through my 
relationship with ‘thou’ [Du], not with ‘it’ [Es].  
The absolute relationship is the relationship between God and ‘I,’ in 
which God stands as the absolute ‘thou’ (Buber 1995, 75). Only the 
entire world stands in this absolute ‘I-Thou’ relationship with God. In 
the ‘I-It’ relationship, where the world stands ‘here’ and God stands 
‘there’ or where God is in the world, ‘I’ as individuality separates 
one(self) from the world (see Buber 1995, 75). 
By developing the system of ‘I-She/He’ relationship as differentiated 
from an ‘I-It’ relationship, Kojima attempts to overcome Buber’s 
theological restraint, which is based on the ‘absolute relationship’ with 
the Absolute as ‘thou,’ in which all of the third parties are suppressed as 
‘non-thou.’ He argues that the calling of the other as ‘thou’ is a 
precondition for the possibility of a genuine encounter (Kojima 2000, 
194). This other ‘thou’ referred to by Kojima includes not only ‘she’ and 
‘he’ as other human beings, but also non-human beings, granting a 
Japanese Buddhist touch to this theological conception of the Judeo-
Islamic-Christian tradition. 
Intersubjectivity relies on individual subjectivity, and the subject 
raises the issue of isolation of ‘I’ from the rest of the world. Husserl 
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writes: “The pure Ego of any given cogitation already has absolute 
individuation, and the cogitation itself is something absolutely 
individual in itself…the lived experiences in the flux of consciousness 
have an essence that is absolutely their own; they bear their 
individuation in themselves” (Husserl 1952, 299-300). The preceding 
(individual) ‘I’ forms the center in all the cases of I-Thou/She/He/It by 
Husserl, Buber and Kojima. 
Even if Kojima adopted certain elements of Japanese thinking and 
even if he attributed animality to other individual subjects in an attempt 
to (re)connect the ‘I’ to the world, he omits the fact that the concept of 
individuality is a concept artificially formulated and translated from 
Western literature to Chinese and Japanese (see Yanabu 2001, 193-205), 
as well as Korean. The concept of individuality, however, is a necessary 
condition for the ‘we’ in traditional phenomenology, for the 
individuality of each subject is the basis of intersubjectivity, and 
intersubjectivity is the ground form of the ‘we.’ As long as the ‘we’ is 
the combination of ‘I’ and ‘the other,’ and ‘the other’ as either ‘you,’ 
‘she,’ ‘he,’ or ‘it,’ this ‘we’ is conceptualized within the framework of 
the individual (and perhaps isolated) subject. Even though Husserlian 
thinkers, including Husserl himself, insist on the subjectivity of the ‘you’ 
in ‘I-Thou’ as ‘subject-subject,’ the ‘I’ still requires the objective 
counterpart to be formulated as ‘I.’ 
 ‘We’ in Korean 
       1. Possessive Form of the ‘We’ 
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In Korean, however, it seems that there is not necessarily a presupposed 
‘I’ at the center of the ‘we.’ In other words, the ‘we’ does not come from 
‘I,’ but rather ‘I’ comes from the ‘we.’ ‘I’ is a superfluous expression in 
Korean, while the ‘we’ is the most common and natural way of 
addressing the self both in spoken and written language. This ‘we’ is a 
single unit as a whole, not as ‘I’ plus ‘I.’ There also exists a plural form 
of the ‘we,’ i.e. ‘we’s in Korean. One of the most significant Korean ‘we’ 
expressions is revealed in the possessive form as ‘our wife’ or ‘our 
husband’ spoken to someone who does not belong together with this 
‘wife’ or ‘husband.’ 
As Carr points out, ‘we’ must indicate ‘my’ affiliated relation to 
someone who is a participant in the conversation (Carr 1986, 524f). But 
in Korean, the addressee does not have to be a member of the group for 
the speaker to be able to say ‘we.’ The husband of ‘our husband’ in 
Korean is regarded neither as ‘he’ nor ‘you’ in contrast to ‘I,’ because 
‘our someone’ as a whole is a subject of community rather than a 
combined form of individual subjects. The members of this ‘our group’ 
are not required to identify with nor participate in the group in order to 
be in this ‘we.’ 
One could argue that it depends on the situation, and that the ‘we’ is 
also said in English among un-related people. For example, two sisters 
could say (a) “we all like dogs” to a visitor, referring to their dog as (b) 
“our dog,” as if they included the visitor in this ‘our.’ In the case of (a), 
this ‘we’ is one typical case of the nosistic ‘we’ as explained above. The 
‘we’ of (b) “our dog” does not necessarily include the visitor in the 
 15 
domain of this particular ‘we.’ It is still ‘our’ dog, that is their, i.e. the 
two sisters’, dog. Even if they mean the ‘we’ including the visitor in this 
case, the visitor still cannot say “our dog” to the sisters referring to the 
sisters’ dog, because it is not his dog. Meanwhile, in Korean, the visitor 
can refer to this dog as “our dog,” and it does not sound strange or wrong 
in any sense. Rather, it is a natural and friendly way of addressing the 
dog, even if the visitor does not exercise ownership over it. The visitor 
would more than likely say “our dog,” especially if she is a dog-lover. 
Here are some more examples that I would like to examine in detail: 
For instance, ‘I’ can say in Korean to ‘my’ father: 
(1) “Our husband (our Stephen) brought home these flowers.” 
‘I’ can also say to another person (S) who is not a member of our 
family: 
(2) “I told our father that our Stephen brought home these flowers.”  
The person (S) who heard this can reply:  
(3) “Our Stephen is thoughtful.”  
In (1), ‘you’ is my father (the addressee) and ‘I’ is ‘I’ in an ‘I-Thou’ 
relationship, but Stephen, the third person, also belongs to the ‘we’ in 
this case, but neither as ‘you’ nor as ‘he.’ These three people are treated 
as one ‘we,’ existing as one extended self. Instead of individuating 
people, the ‘we’ can be formulated into a plural form which itself reveals 
the plurality of people. 
If ‘my’ father says “we all like flowers,” this means that ‘we’ all three 
like flowers. But this ‘we’ does not have to be divided into three different 
individuals to reveal the fact that there is more than one person. Nor 
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does there have to be first an ‘I,’ ‘you,’ or ‘he’ to create the ‘we,’ but the 
‘we’ is there before this individuation.  
In (2), our father is not shared with the addressee (S), but the 
addressee (S) still belongs together in this ‘we’ group of ‘our father.’ In 
(3) also, the addresser (S) does not have any personal relationship with 
Stephen, but this addresser (S) again belongs to this ‘we.’ This belonging 
together presupposes the preceding co-being or co-existence of the 
world. In all the cases of (1), (2), and (3), ‘I’ as an individual self is not 
required, and Stephen, the father, and the third person (S) are not 
reduced to ‘he’ or ‘she’ in contrast to ‘I.’ 
In Korean, there is another expression for parties excluded from the 
‘we.’ To point at a person, you can say ‘this person’ or ‘that person’ as 
in Germanic languages, but there is a third demonstrative pronoun in 
Korean which is kŭ.3 This is hard to translate into Germanic languages 
because there is no matching term for this concept. This particular 
demonstrative pronoun refers to someone or something that does not 
belong to the ‘we.’ In this sense, the ‘we’ itself as a whole can be 
opposed to the one who does not belong to it, which is not ‘you,’ nor 
‘he/she,’ nor ‘they,’ nor ‘this,’ nor ‘that.’ 
This reveals another whole dimension of the ‘we.’ Only this ‘not-in-
the-we-belonging’ person can be taken as an object in contrast to the all, 
who belong to the preceding ‘we.’ The ‘we’ or “our we’s” stand in 
contrast to someone who is not this person, nor that person, nor 
‘she/he/it,’ nor ‘they,’ but to someone who does not belong to this ‘we’ 
                                                             
3 This was Romanized from ‘그’ following the McCune-Reischauer format.  
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at all by existing in a separate time and space. This distance is, however, 
not only spatio-temporal, but also emotional and psychological, 
referring to someone I do not know (wissen aber nicht kennen). Even a 
stranger, however, at the same time, if she/he is present with me in the 
conversation, could belong to the ‘we,’ because by being there, that 
person is no longer another object in contrast to the ‘we.’ 
A stranger and ‘my’ father are not the same ‘he,’ but they can be 
included in the ‘we,’ in which ‘I,’ the addressee (my father or the 
stranger), and the third person, Stephen in this case, who is referred to 
in the conversation, belong together in the ‘we.’ This belonging together 
does not, however, necessarily entail a social or psychological bond 
between different individuals. In this ‘we,’ these three individuals’ 
memories are not necessarily shared, nor do their individual time-
consciousnesses overlap to construct a common, shared timeline, but 
they nevertheless belong together. 
2. Belongingness: Inclusive and Exclusive ‘We’ 
Related to this inclusiveness, ‘we’ can note that there is another level of 
separation of ‘we’ from the other, to which the notion of clusivity in 
linguistics refers. Clusivity indicates the grammatical distinction 
between the inclusive and the exclusive ‘we.’ The former ‘we’ means 
the ‘we’ as ‘you and I,’ while the latter ‘we’ means ‘they/he/she/it and I 
but not you’ excluding the addressee(s). This distinction is mundanely 
expressed in Korean. There are, in effect, two different forms of the ‘we’ 
in Korean which are u-ri and chŏ-hi.4 The first ‘we’ as u-ri functions as 
                                                             
4 These refer to ‘우리’ and ‘저희’ respectively. 
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the inclusive and exclusive ‘we,’ but chŏ-hi is almost always used as the 
exclusive ‘we.’ However, u-ri as the exclusive ‘we’ can be said only in 
cases when the addressee is of equal age or younger than the addresser, 
or the ages of the addresser and addressee are very close. 
In fact, the answer for the question as to why “chŏ-hi is almost always 
used as the exclusive we” is still controversial however. One can say 
“chŏ-hi institute did everything from chŏ-hi side to prepare for the 
conference” to her boss who works at the same institute. Or a child can 
ask her grandmother, “did chŏ-hi family come from the north?” referring 
to ‘their’ family as chŏ-hi family. In both cases, the boss and 
grandmother also belong to this chŏ-hi. Indeed, chŏ-hi is used very 
frequently in similar contexts, but most of the time it is an honorific error. 
The right way to refer to their ‘shared’ institute or family is not chŏ-hi 
but u-ri. 
What is significant about the patterns of using the exclusive ‘we’ in 
Korean is that the addresser uses the ‘we’ even if the addresser refers to 
herself in the first person singular. For example, in Korean ‘our home’ 
is a common expression, said in the form of ‘u-ri/chŏ-hi home’, which 
refers to ‘my home,’ with ‘my’ referring to the addresser. The addresser, 
of course, could have meant ‘our home’ which belongs not only to 
herself but to her other family members as well. But even when the 
addresser who says ‘u-ri/chŏ-hi home’ is a single person who lives alone, 
or in an extreme case, who never had a family in her entire life and who 
has always lived alone, who would still say ‘u-ri/chŏ-hi home’ when she 
wants to talk about her home to others. In this case, one can see the ‘we’ 
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(our, us) is more commonly used in Korean than ‘I’ (my, me) to mean 
the actual ‘I’ (the first person singular). 
Possessive expressions such as “u-ri/chŏ-hi home,” or “u-ri/chŏ-hi 
husband,” or “u-ri/chŏ-hi kids,” etc. do not presuppose or require the 
complete separation of ‘I’ from the ‘other’ who belongs to this group of 
‘we,’ if there are others in this ‘we.’ When ‘u-ri’/‘chŏ-hi’ as the 
exclusive ‘we’ is used as a subject noun, however, for example “we [u-
ri/chŏ-hi] eat sugary breakfast,” this ‘u-ri’/‘chŏ-hi’ includes the third 
party who eats the sugary breakfast together with the addresser. The 
addresser would not necessarily use ‘u-ri’/‘chŏ-hi’ instead of ‘I,’ if she 
always eats alone. But at the same time, the addresser would say “I eat 
sugary breakfast,” only when she wants to emphasize the ‘I’ in this 
sentence, in other words, to distinguish ‘my’ different taste or habit of 
breakfast from the addressee or the other. Beyond that, one would say 
that she eats sugary breakfast without a personal pronoun at all, for 
example: “[…] eat sugary breakfast,” without a subject noun, ‘I’ in this 
case. 
The exclusive ‘we’ in Korean brings with it another whole package of 
cultural elements, one of which is the honorific as briefly mentioned 
above. The ‘chŏ-hi’ as the exclusive ‘we’ is used not necessarily to 
‘exclude’ the addressee, but rather it is used to express respect for the 
addressee, as opposed to when ‘u-ri’ is used as the exclusive ‘we.’ More 
specifically, when the addresser talks to a person or a group of people 
who are older or placed higher in the relevant hierarchy system, or who 
the addresser simply does not know or is not close to, she uses ‘chŏ-hi’ 
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to refer to herself and her group instead of ‘u-ri.’ The distance the 
addresser creates in her conversation room with the ‘other’ is an 
expression of respect in most cases rather than an instance of separating 
herself deliberately from the addressee. Of course, ‘chŏ-hi’ could also 
draw a clear line between the addressee and the addresser, when it is 
necessary to distinguish the ‘other’ from me or us. ‘Chŏ-hi’ sounds, 
however, not as aggressive and exclusive as the first person singular 
form ‘my.’ 
The distinction between the inclusive and exclusive forms is almost 
universally found among the Austronesian languages and the languages 
of northern Australia (see Cysouw, 2013). Also, there are some 
languages that have a pronoun expressing ‘we’ which is used for 
expressing ‘I.’ For example, in Qawasqar, “cecaw qjeq’ja qjenaq afxat” 
could mean “I ran yesterday” or “we ran yesterday,” and there is no way 
to decide from this sentence alone if it means ‘I’ or ‘we’ who ran 
yesterday. This usage is rather uncommon, but there are languages with 
no specialized plural pronouns, as with Maricopa (see Cysouw, 2013). 
In Korean, there is a distinction between ‘I’ and ‘we,’ and they are used 
in different contexts unlike in Qawasqar. However, the ‘we’ representing 
oneself is a more commonly used expression, as mentioned above, while 
‘I’ is used intentionally to refer to the ‘own-ness’ of the self in special 
occasions. 
In the case of ‘chŏ-hi,’ which separates the addresser from the present 
addressee, however, the present co-being of the addresser with the 
addressee is not expressed in the form of the ‘we.’ As mentioned above, 
 21 
the ‘chŏ-hi’ is close to the exclusive ‘we.’ This commonly used form of 
the exclusive ‘we,’ ‘chŏ-hi,’ reveals evidence for the possibility of the 
‘we’ beyond the ‘I-Thou’ relationship, because in the ‘chŏ-hi,’ the third 
party who belongs to this ‘we’ but is not present in the moment is not 
excluded. When ‘I’ say that “chŏ-hi wife likes Korean food,” the wife 
who is not present at the conversation site still belongs to the ‘we’ (chŏ-
hi) together with the addresser. In this ‘chŏ-hi,’ ‘I’ and my wife belong 
together in the ‘we,’ excluding the addressee who is ‘you’ from this 
conversation. This third person (wife) included in the ‘chŏ-hi’ is 
distinguished from the ‘kŭ’ person, who is not only not present in this 
moment but also does not belong to this ‘we’ group at all. 
One interesting point is that native Korean speakers are commonly 
confused between ‘chŏ-hi’ and ‘u-ri.’ Not only children, but adults also 
quite often make the mistake of saying ‘u-ri’ in the situation where it is 
proper to say ‘chŏ-hi.’ However, this mistake is not grammatically 
wrong, but it is not proper because it does not sound polite. In other 
words, it is an honorific error, not a grammatical fault. Therefore, ‘chŏ-
hi’ cannot be used as counterevidence that proves that the ‘we’ in Korean 
is technically the same as the first person singular ‘I.’ ‘Chŏ-hi’ is an 
honorific form of the ‘we’ which is used in place of the ‘u-ri.’ Strictly 
speaking, ‘chŏ-hi’ does not always come with the clear and determined 
intention of excluding a certain group or a person as in the case of the 
exclusive ‘we.’ For example, it is not intended to exclude the audience 
when it is said “chŏ-hi [our] husband is from this town.” The ‘chŏ-hi’ in 
this statement gives the information of the addressee, that this addressee 
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is older, or someone with a higher social status than the addresser, or not 
close to the addresser. ‘Chŏ-hi’ is a modest way of saying ‘we’ that does 
not necessarily intend to exclude the present addressee in this case. 
‘U-ri’ and the ‘chŏ-hi’ can be compared to the two different forms of 
‘I’ in Korean in terms of ‘na’ and ‘chŏ.’5 They both mean ‘I’ with no 
semantic difference other than the honorific distinction. The latter one 
is the honorific form of the former one. As in the case of ‘chŏ-hi’ and 
‘u-ri,’ if one replaces ‘chŏ’ with ‘na,’ it is not grammatically wrong but 
could be seen as lacking courtesy within certain situations. 
This ‘chŏ-hi,’ however, cannot replace ‘u-ri’ in the case of ‘our 
Stephen’ as in Sentence (3): “Our Stephen is thoughtful,” as spoken by 
a stranger who is not related to Stephen or Stephen’s family. The point 
that I would like to raise in this context is not that there are two different 
forms of ‘we’ in Korean in order to then show how they fit the analysis 
of the inclusive and the exclusive ‘we,’ but rather that there is a case 
such as ‘our Stephen’ spoken by a person who does not share any social 
identification or group membership with Stephen, in which the addresser, 
the addressee, and the third person, either related or unrelated, are there 
together as the ‘we.’  
3. ‘We’ as Pre-Subjective 
The possessive form of ‘our’ in Korean is not quite intersubjective. 
Rather, it is a pre-subjective ‘we’ and does not reflect the subjectivity of 
a personal pronoun, nor a subject-object structure. The individuality of 
a subject is unveiled in the personal pronouns as ‘I,’ ‘he,’ ‘she,’ and ‘it.’ 
                                                             
5 These refer to ‘나’ and ‘저’ respectively. 
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Understanding the subject in terms of individuality is not a natural way 
of understanding a person in Korean, where a person is referred to by 
their personal name or the name of their relationship to the person who 
refers to them. For example, my father and a random man whom I ran 
into on the street can never be the same ‘he,’ even if both of them are a 
third-person, masculine singular.  
In this community where all ‘he’s are not the same ‘he’s and ‘she’s 
not the same ‘she’s, the ‘we’ is not a collection of ‘I’ and any other ‘he’ 
or ‘she’ or ‘it.’ ‘I’ can say ‘our Stephen,’ who is ‘my’ husband, to anyone, 
including ‘our father’ or to a stranger. All of these people and Stephen, 
however, do not have to belong to or form a certain group together. ‘My’ 
husband is not shared when ‘I’ say ‘our husband.’ Neither ‘my’ father 
nor the stranger can say ‘our husband,’ but they can still say ‘our Stephen’ 
even if they are not related to Stephen in any possible way. 
This ‘we’ in ‘our Stephen’ is a pre-subjective ‘we’ that is not based on 
the distinction and coalescence of ‘I’ the addresser, ‘you’ the addressee, 
and the third party, because this ‘u-ri’ [our] in ‘our Stephen’ does not 
mean that the addresser possesses Stephen. But by adding ‘u-ri’ [‘we’] 
in front of the person who is spoken about, the co-existence of the 
addresser, the addressee, and the third party is expressed as the pre-
condition of the existence of each existent. Although this ‘we’ is 
expressed in a possessive form placed in front of a noun, the possessive 
form of the ‘we’ is not distinguishable from the subjective ‘we’ unless 
one adds a postpositional particle next to the ‘u-ri’ and the ‘chŏ-hi.’ The 
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[co-]being of all e three (the addresser, the addressee, and the third party) 
is presupposed in this ‘we.’  
An answer for why the Korean ‘we’ is more than a collection of ‘I’s 
related to the ‘we’ points not at the  ‘we’  as an extended self which 
extinguishes the notion of plurality in the ‘we,’ but at  the ‘we’ as an 
extended self that is a pre-subjective ‘we’ that yields room for individual 
selves, or a post-subjective ‘we’ that is formed after the gathering of 
individual selves. From this analysis, the conclusion that ‘we’ can draw 
is not an answer, but a new question: Can clusivity be both a pre-
subjective and a post-subjective concept? 
This pre-subjective ‘we’ is possible not through overlapped or 
proactively shared memories or histories, but through space, where they 
are together, which is to say by literally ‘being there.’ Their spatio-
temporal being-together in the ‘we’ is possible through their being-there 
(Da-sein). The time-space construction in the structure of this ‘we’ as 
‘(together)-being-there’ could be expected to tell us something that the 
concepts of Weltkoexistenz by Husserl and In-der-Welt-Sein by 
Heidegger have not precisely revealed to us as of yet, where ‘my’ 
individual time-consciousness or temporality of the ‘I’ is constituted 
‘here’ while ‘you’ are ‘there’ rather than constituting ‘our’ time. 
 Phenomenological Research on ‘We’ in Korean 
1. The Aim of the Research 
The ‘phenomenological we’ and empathy are fashionable themes in 
contemporary European philosophy. However, these concepts need to 
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be dealt with not only from the European continental perspective; 
research should also extend its realm to non-European contexts. This 
paper specifically focuses on the ‘we’ in Korean. In Korean, the ‘we’ is 
not merely the plural of ‘I’s. This Korean concept comes with a fairly 
different spectrum of meanings than that of the Germanic languages. 
This could further highlight the lively concept of ‘world-coexistence’ 
and be used to more deeply explore ‘empathy’ through the particular 
personal and academic background of the researcher as a Korean person. 
Even Husserl on a few occasions goes so far as to speak of a kind of 
empathy involved in appropriating foreign traditions (Husserl 1973c, 
436; 2006, 372-373, see also Zahavi 2013, 136).  
This paper does not, however, aim to promote the peculiar case of the 
Korean concept ‘we’ in order to situate it next to its counterparts in 
European philosophy. It rather aims to set one initial attempt to widen 
the range, not of European nor Korean, but of general philosophical 
understanding. It does so by introducing a phenomenological analysis 
of a specific case of the Korean concept of ‘we,’ in the hope of unveiling 
a new perspective in traditional phenomenology with particular respect 
to verwirklichen in the Husserlian spirit of philosophy which advocates 
openness in philosophical thinking. 
The task is not to discover all explainable rules and linguistic patterns 
of the ‘we’ in all existing languages, but to conform to the 
phenomenological method of analyzing the understanding of self 
thereby enlarge our philosophical perspectives. This article analyzes the 
‘we’ in the Korean language as a flint to strike a fire, to challenge the 
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exclusive research perspective of the phenomenological, or rather 
philosophical studies of subjectivity and intersubjectivity which claim 
to be the universal understanding of human beings; as one of the most 
well-known philosophical paroles proclaims “as long as ‘we’ exist as 
human beings, philosophy lies in our existence.” There is no philosophy 
that does not start from the actual existence of an individual human 
being. Traditional European philosophy has, in a way, deleted the ‘other 
side’ of the world from their ‘universal’ research. However, this does not 
mean pushing ‘anti-Europe’ or anti-(European)-philosophy, which 
would impede the process of recovering the ‘conversation’ with the other. 
What I insist upon here is that traditional philosophy needs to reach 
out more in order to have not only a wider but also deeper insight of our 
understanding about ourselves and the world. This research on the 
phenomenological ‘we’ and the Korean ‘we’ stands as one attempt to 
contribute to a much-discussed theme in contemporary phenomenology, 
namely social intentionality, with a new ‘horizon’ of understanding. 
2. Why Phenomenology? 
Then why a phenomenological analysis of the ‘we’? Bernasconi’s 
description of phenomenology provides an answer to this question: 
“phenomenology’s distinctiveness lies in its sensitivity to the question 
of how the investigator gains access to what is to be investigated” 
(Bernasconi 2009, 204).  
How can an investigator gain access to the ‘we’? When it comes to 
researching the ‘we,’ I want to start to investigate how ‘we’ can say ‘we’ 
at all rather than starting with the premise that ‘we’ say ‘we.’ However, 
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I can only start from my practice of saying ‘we.’ This action of ‘saying’ 
is fundamentally grounded in the language(s) that I use. For me to be 
able to say ‘we’ means that I can say ‘we,’ ‘wir,’ ‘u-ri,’ ‘chŏ-hi,’ etc.   
To what then must this investigation be sensitive? And how can an 
investigator gain and maintain this sensitivity? If a phenomenological 
investigator is required to switch off her mother-tongue in order to adjust 
her way of thinking so as to have access to a phenomenological research 
method in order to investigate in Germanic languages, in part because 
the language and the system of ‘traditional’ philosophy is considered to 
be found in Germanic languages, where then can this investigator 
acquire the sensitivity needed for this investigation? 
This absurd situation is comparable with the situation of the 
phenomenology of religion. Can a phenomenologist investigate a 
religion completely unrelated to her religious background? Here what is 
meant by ‘religious’ also includes the case of the investigator having an 
atheist or non-religious stance. Bernasconi writes: 
 
Precisely which religions are open to the individual investigator
 are determined in advance by the investigator’s personal life story. 
To learn about other religions, the phenomenologist has to revert to the 
testimony of other investigators and draw parallels that assume what is 
to be established. This restricts the range of phenomena available for 
 investigation at the very time when the phenomenology is trying to 
be most open. (Bernasconi 2009, 205)  
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In this context, ‘we’ should ask again: can an investigator of the ‘we’ 
think of the ‘we’ detached from the practices of saying ‘we’ in her 
mother-tongue language? The investigator has to constantly ask herself 
how she can retain her sensitivity and her phenomenological method 
with the utmost degree of openness. Each investigator’s personal life 
story starts with her language. This leads us naturally to our next 
question: why Korean? 
3. Why Korean? 
Why Korean? Why do non-Koreans have to care about an analysis of 
the Korean ‘we’? This simple question calls for a change of paradigm, 
a transformation in the way of thinking. Surprisingly, there are other 
dimensions of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity that are not based 
on the single linguistic ground of Germanic languages. “Die Sprache ist 
ein Transformationsmittel” (Paul Valéry, quoted from Elberfeld 2007, 
26). Language can function as a means of transformation only under the 
condition that it enables conversations. In other words, language that 
makes this transformation possible communicates. Philosophy could 
become “a mediator,” says Hannah Arendt, “between many truths, not 
because it holds the one truth valid for all men, but because only in 
reasoned communication can what each man believes in his isolation 
from all others become humanly and actually true.” (Arendt 1994, 442: 
see also Schenkenberger 2018). The language of philosophy can remain 
vital and strong only when it communicates. 
One privilege of this research lies, ironically, in that the kind of 
approach that reaches out to other cultures has seldom been taken 
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seriously in the traditional phenomenological context. At first sight, it 
almost feels as if it is beyond our capability to understand when you find 
out that in Malagasy the distinction between subject and object is not 
naturally conceived. The question of “how on earth can ‘we’ think 
without the concepts of subject and object?” reminds one of question 
“can non-Europeans think?” raised by Hamid Dabashi, who also 
specifically asks, “Why is European philosophy ‘philosophy,’ but 
African philosophy ‘ethnophilosophy’?” (Dabashi 2013).  
As I was giving a lecture in Antananarivo, Madagascar, I was told that 
the Malagasy people could not naturally understand, based on their 
language, the distinction between the subjective ‘I’ and the objective ‘I,’ 
as in the Ich = Ich formulation. They explained that it is because at the 
moment they ‘understand’ an object, this object becomes a part of 
themselves. In this context, the ‘I-Thou’ and the ‘I-it’ relationship, for 
example, should be laid out in line within a different spectrum of 
understanding. 
Karl Löwith also tried to go beyond the conventional understanding 
of the theological boundaries of the discourse on intersubjectivity 
conforming to Buber’s ‘I-Thou’ model, but he came at it from a different 
path than Kojima. For him, ‘being-together-with-each-other’ 
(Miteinandersein) and communication are crucial for understanding the 
relationship between ‘I’ and ‘thou,’ and therefore in this context 
language plays a primary role, which is the first thing that enables 
communication at all (see Löwith 1928, 148f). However, insofar as 
Dabashi criticizes other ‘traditional’ philosophers (Dabashi 2013), 
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Löwith is also implicated, as his range of language was only European; 
he could neither read nor speak non-European languages. I do not intend 
to underestimate his philosophy nor fetishize minority languages and 
their special linguistic characters here. However, this is a noteworthy but 
also not uncommon example that shows how firmly and fundamentally 
the system of traditional philosophy is based and structured on a 
basically mono-lingual background. 
So, why Korean? I have a blunt, true, and very personal but also 
phenomenological answer: because I speak Korean. I can think, 
categorize, understand, imagine, dream, and communicate in Korean. 
Why not Korean? 
4. Previous Research on ‘We’ in Korean 
There are studies not only from a linguistic point of view in language 
pedagogy (Ju, Woal-Rang 2013, Jeong, Kyeong-Ouk 2005), but also 
from the perspectives of Korean studies (Choi, Jun-Sik 2016), of 
Chinese literature (Jung, Jae-Seo 2010, 2011), and of comparative 
philosophy (Lee, Kwang_Sae 2006) that have examined the meaning of 
Korean identity connected to the ‘we’ concept, yet this ‘we’ applies only 
to those with a Korean identity, i.e. their ‘we’ indicates only ‘we 
Koreans.’ Yong-Hyeok Kwon (2012) and Su-Jung Kim (2002) treat ‘we’ 
in the context of an East Asian family community culture, in which they 
try to define the particularity of this family community compared to an 
individualistic social structure.  
Similarly, Dae-Ho Cho (2002) studied the manner of communication 
of Koreans in order to examine and criticize the social structure of Korea. 
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Cho argues that there are basically no personal pronouns in Korean, and 
that ‘we’ contains a different meaning than that of the Germanic 
languages, but this research is without a detailed analysis of the ‘we.’ 
These studies show some examples of how the concept ‘we’ is applied 
in Korean and the social contexts that accompanies it; however, the 
present research method is focused on illustrating the facts of Korean 
phenomena, rather than dealing with the ‘we’ in a 
phenomenological/existential sense.  
In social and political philosophy, Yoon-ki Hong, Seok-Su Kim, Yoo-
Seon Lee, and Ui-Soo Kim (2001) present their new identity-subject 
theories for a globalized society, in which the ‘we’ as an East-Asian 
community value is partially suggested as an alternative to the concept 
of subjectivity, which is typical of the Western way of thinking. For this 
approach, however, it is hard to escape the criticism that it is 
fundamentally based on the naïve dichotomy of the East-West paradigm, 
in the belief that the one side supplements what is insufficient from the 
other. The Korean ‘we’ is, in this context, not only analyzed on a 
conventional level, but also treated as if it could, in its representation of 
Eastern values and wisdom, substitute for, or at least amend, the old-
fashioned concept of subjectivity. 
 Conclusion 
We started an analysis of the ‘we’ with the following questions: 
(1) Is the ‘we’ more than a collection of ‘I’s (individuals)? 
(2) Can the ‘we’ precede ‘I’ and ‘you’? 
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(3) Is there a place for a third ‘other’ in the structure of the we? 
Our investigation into the way ‘we’ is used in the Korean language 
could give us some clues to these questions. So far, we could conclude 
that the possessive form of the ‘we’ in Korean as ‘our someone’ unfolds 
a new dimension of the this ‘we,’ because this ‘our someone’ is not 
structured from within the ‘I-Thou’ formulation, and it thereby opens  
space for the third party in this ‘we’ group, including someone who is 
not present between the addresser (I) and the addressee (you), and an 
unrelated addresser can also refer to the third other as ‘our someone.’  
In English, this is expressed only in the possessive form ‘our,’ as 
distinguished from the subject form ‘we,’ but in Korean the subjective 
and the possessive form are not distinguished. Therefore, ‘our someone’ 
in Korean is also often said without the implication or connotation of a 
state or an action of possession. To native Korean speakers, ‘our 
someone’ does not sound different from ‘we someone,’ as if there were 
‘we’ as someone and someone as ‘we.’ After this ‘we’ dissolves and 
breaks down into ‘I,’ ‘you,’ and someone else, there comes ‘I,’ ‘you,’ and 
someone. In this sense, I argue that this ‘we’ is pre-subjective, which 
means that this ‘we’ precedes ‘I’ and ‘you,’ i.e. the ‘we’ is not always a 
result of the agglomeration of ‘I’ and ‘you.’  
This particular formulation of ‘we’ as ‘our someone’ does not take ‘I’ 
as a prerequisite of this ‘we.’ This ‘we’ does not necessarily need to be 
made up of individuals associated with being members of or identifying 
with a group, but instead acts as an extended self, in which the ‘we’ is 
large enough for the ‘other’ to come in. This someone in ‘our someone’ 
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is not solely another individual who is not ‘I’ or not a part of ‘I,’ but this 
someone exists in the ‘we’ as ‘our someone’ with the addresser and also 
the addressee according to the situation. This ‘we’ as an extended self is 
not a collection of ‘I’s and someone else or other ‘I’s, nor is it a plural 
of ‘I.’ The idealistic process whereby ‘I’ objectify myself (‘I’) to have 
the concept of ‘I,’ then perceive someone or ‘you’ as not-‘I,’ and then 
add these not-‘I’s to form ‘we’ is rather a subsequent theorem than a 
prerequisite in this case of the ‘we.’ As extended self in the form of ‘our 
someone,’ ‘we’ is not formed after the process of ‘I’ adding another ‘I’ 
to her ‘I’-ness. This ‘we,’ which precedes ‘I’ and ‘you,’ therefore, is not 
a collection of ‘I’s. 
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